Republic of the
Supreme Court
SECOND DIVISION
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PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, Petitioner, -
versus - CARLOS ANG GOBONSENG, JR., Respondent. |
G.R. No. 163562
Present:
PUNO, J., Chairperson, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, AZCUNA, and GARCIA,
JJ. Promulgated: |
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D E C I S I O N
GARCIA, J.:
In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, petitioner Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Pilipinas
Shell, hereafter) seeks the reversal and setting aside of the Decision[1]
dated October 10, 2003 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 63777, as reiterated in its Resolution[2]
of April 13, 2004, reversing an earlier decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Negros Oriental, Dumaguete City, Branch 40, in a suit for collection
of rentals with damages thereat commenced by the herein respondent Carlos Ang Gobonseng
against, among others, the herein petitioner.
The rentals sought to be collected pertain to a gasoline station at
The
factual backdrop:
Sometime
on January 5, 1982, one Julio Tan Pastor, original owner of Lot No. 853-A, sold
it to the respondent for P1.3 million, albeit in the covering Deed of
Absolute Sale executed by the parties, the amount indicated was only P13,000.00,
evidently to avoid payment of the correct legal fees in the registration and
transfer of title to the vendee. On the
same date, however, the parties, in order to reflect their real intentions,
executed a Memorandum of Agreement thereunder spelling out the true terms and
conditions of their transaction, to wit:
“1. Purchase price is P1,300,000.00 (P1.3 million);
2. P500,000.00 shall be paid upon the execution of the Deed of Sale. Out of this amount part shall be paid to whatever mortgage obligation there is with the Philippines National Bank and/or any other bank involving lot no. 853-A; and its improvements;
3.
Balance of P800,000.00 will be paid in five (5) years
at a yearly payment of P160,000.00 the first payment to be paid one year from
date hereof and succeeding four installments every year thereafter;
4.
All obligations or liabilities on or involving lot no.
853-A or its improvements such as electric bills, water bills, telephone bills,
etc., shall be for the account of the VENDOR which if not paid will be
automatically deductible from the first payment of the remaining balance;
5. Real property taxes full for 1981 over lot no. 853-A and its improvements, capital gains tax, documentary stamp tax, sales tax shall be shouldered by the VENDOR; Registration expenses shall be shouldered by the VENDEE;
6.
Upon the execution of the Deed of Sale, ownership and
possession shall automatically pass to the VENDEE; The VENDOR agrees to pay a
penalty of P500.00 for every day of delay in vacating the property;”
Respondent,
armed with the inaccurate Deed of Absolute Sale earlier executed by Julio Tan
Pastor, and notwithstanding the Memorandum of Agreement aforementioned,
succeeded in registering the conveying instrument with the Registry of Deeds
and was then issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 13607 over Lot No.
853-A in his own name.
In the
meantime, vendor Tan Pastor presented for encashment the postdated checks
issued to him by respondent as payment for the subject lot. Unfortunately, the drawee bank dishonored
those checks for a variety of reasons, namely, drawn against insufficient
funds, stop payment order or closed account.
This prompted vendor Tan Pastor to file against respondent a criminal
action for violation of Batas Pambansa (BP) 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing
Checks Law, docketed as Criminal Case No. 7071, entitled People of the
It
appears that prior to the sale of Lot No. 853-A to respondent, Tan Pastor had
been operating thereon a gasoline station, first with Flying A, subsequently with Getty
Oil, and later with Basic Land Oil and Energy Corporation (BLECOR).
In
1982, Pilipinas Shell acquired BLECOR,
including all the latter’s assets, liabilities and contracts. Thereafter, Tan Pastor remained as the
distributor of Pilipinas Shell products and continued to operate the gas
station on Lot No. 853-A until 1991.
Sometime
in 1991, respondent sent demand letters to Pilipinas Shell for payment by the
latter of rentals for its occupancy and use of his property. Responding to said letters, Pilipinas Shell
disowned liability for the rentals, explaining that the gas station on Lot No.
853-A was a dealer-owned filling station, hence the demands for rental
payment must be directed to Tan Pastor.
In any event, Pilipinas Shell, hoping for an amicable settlement of the
controversy between respondent and Tan Pastor relative to Lot No. 853-A,
facilitated a meeting between the two.
True
enough, on January 30, 1992, thru the efforts of Pilipinas Shell, Tan Pastor
and respondent executed an Agreement[3]
embodying the following terms and conditions:
“The
parties herein have agreed, as follows:
1.
For humanitarian, peace, and other considerations,
Carlos A. Gobonseng, Jr., the OWNER, hereby allows Julio Tan Pastor the use of
Lot No. 853-A at Corner Real-Urdaneta Streets, Dumaguete City, covered by TCT
No. 13607, as a gas/ fuel/ gasoline/ oil/ filling, selling and servicing,
station, and for such other use appropriate, or related, to the same, without
any rental for a period of THREE (3) YEARS from January 1st 1992, or
up to December 31st 1994, NON-EXTENDIBLE;
2.
Consistent with the foregoing, Julio Tan Pastor is
authorized to enter into any business contract with a third person for the use
of said property for a period of THREE (3) YEARS from JANUARY 1st
1992 or up to DECEMBER 31st 1994, the DEADLINE;
3.
No construction, renovation or repair, shall be done by
Julio Tan Pastor, without the PRIOR written consent of the owner, Carlos A.
Gobonseng, Jr.;
4.
All improvements, including old and new constructions,
repairs, replacements, and other removable items, shall automatically belong in
ownership to the owner, Carlos A. Gobonseng, Jr., upon and at the time of
completion of construction of work, installation or repair or replacement,
excluding those owned or constructed by Shell Petroleum Corp., or Francisco
“Baludoy” Salva, which shall automatically belong to Carlos Ang Gobonseng, Jr.
upon the expiration of the lease contract which the latter executed in favor of
Francisco C. Salva;
5.
Subject to the terms and conditions stipulated in the
contract of lease between Carlos Ang Gobonseng, Jr. and Francisco C. Salva,
Julio Tan Pastor and children or heirs, or Lessee, or third person, obligate
and undertake to VACATE Lot No. 853-A NOT later than
6.
All the parties herein have no more further claimes
against each other, and waived, abandoned, relinquished, any such claim or
claims;
Thereafter,
Tan Pastor executed and filed in Criminal Case No. 7071 an Affidavit of Desistance
thereunder making known his lack of interest in further pursuing the case,
which was eventually dismissed.
The
controversy could have ended there were it not for the fact that on
In its
Answer, Pilipinas Shell countered that plaintiff’s claim for unpaid rentals had
no basis because the gasoline station on his property is a dealer-owned
filling station, as evidenced by a certification[4] issued by the president of the Shell Dealers
Association of the
In the
meantime, Tan Pastor died, leaving his heirs who were accordingly substituted as
Pilipinas Shell’s co-defendant in the case.
On
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, plaintiff’s complaint for collection of rental and damages
against Pilipinas Shell and the heirs of Julio Tan Pastor is hereby dismissed
for lack of cause of action against them.
Further,
plaintiff (Gobonseng) is hereby ordered to pay defendant Pilipinas Shell the
amount of P150,000.00 for the other defendants, the heirs of Julio Tan Pastor.
The cross-claim filed by defendant Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation against its co-defendants, the heirs of Julio Tan Pastor is hereby denied for lack of legal basis.
SO ORDERED.
Therefrom, respondent went to the CA.
As
stated at the threshold hereof, the CA, in its Decision[6]
of
“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is entered, ordering appellee Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation to pay unto appellant: P8,000 per month as reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of Lot No. 853-A as a Shell refilling station starting from 1982 until 1991 plus interest at 12% per annum until fully paid and attorney’s fees of 20% of the total amount due the appellant, without prejudice to its cross-claim against its co-defendants, which is hereby reinstated and prompt resolution of which by the court a quo is hereby directed.
SO
ORDERED.”
With
its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the CA in its equally
challenged Resolution[7]
of
1) Whether or not the decision of the Honorable Court of Appeals in upholding the ownership by Respondent of Lot 853-A is in accordance with the provision of Article 1496 of the Civil Code of the Philippines considering that there was no delivery yet to the Respondent of the property which was the subject of a contract of sale between him and Julio Tan Pastor;
2) Whether or not the decision of the Honorable Court of Appeals making the Petitioner liable for the payment of rentals for the use of Lot 853-A by Julio Tan Pastor as an operator of a dealer-owned filling station is consistent with Article 1157 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides for the legal sources of obligation;
3) Whether or not the decision of the Honorable Court of Appeals in reversing the findings of facts of the trial court on the ground that the judge who penned the decision is not the one who heard the testimonies of all the witnesses, is in accordance with the general rule that the trial court’s decision is to be given credence and accorded due preference by the appellate court.
Then, as now, respondent
insists that he had sufficiently established his ownership of Lot No. 853-A thru
the Deed of Absolute Sale, the Memorandum of Agreement between him and Tan
Pastor, TCT No. 13607 and his faithful and religious payments of the real
estate taxes due on the property. To
him, the existence of a gasoline station in his property since 1982 entitles
him to the payment of rentals by Pilipinas Shell.
Pilipinas Shell, on the other hand,
contends that respondent is without cause of action against it. It asserts non-liability for rentals because
the gasoline station on
Apparently, Tan Pastor did not see the
need to inform Pilipinas Shell of the change in ownership of the subject lot
primarily because according to him, ownership of the lot remained with him
until full payment of the agreed price shall have been effected. As it appears,
Pilipinas Shell totally believed Tan
Pastor’s representation since there was indeed a pending criminal case for
violation of BP 22 against respondent, coupled by the fact that Tan Pastor
continued to be in possession and use of Lot No. 853-A as a filling and service
station for Pilipinas Shell’s petroleum products until 1992.
We grant the petition.
Anent the issue of ownership of
It must be stressed that a contract of
sale is not a real, but a consensual contract.
In Buenaventura v. Court of
Appeals,[8]
this Court made it clear that a contract of sale, being consensual in nature,
becomes valid and binding upon the meeting of the minds of the parties as to
the object and the price. If there is a
meeting of the minds, the contract is valid despite the manner of payment, or
even if the manner of payment was
breached.
In fine, it is not the act of payment of
the contract price that determines the validity of a contract of sale. The manner of payment and the payment itself
of the agreed price have nothing to do with the perfection of the
contract. Payment of the price goes into
the performance of the contract. Failure
of a party to effect payment of the contract price results in a right to demand
the fulfillment or cancellation of the obligation under an existing valid
contract.[9]
Here, the controversy
between Tan Pastor and respondent with respect to the manner of payment or the
breach thereof does not vitiate the validity and binding effect of their
contract of sale. In this light, respondent
cannot thus be faulted for registering the document of sale and successfully
securing TCT No. 13607 covering
However, coming to
the more basic issue herein of whether or not respondent is entitled to the
payment of rentals by Pilipinas Shell for the use and occupancy of Lot No.
853-A, the Court finds and so holds that respondent’s claim has no basis in
fact and in law.
To the mind of the Court, respondent’s entitlement to rentals turns on
the nature of the gasoline station being operated by Tan Pastor on the subject lot.
To resolve this, we must necessarily venture into determining whether the
gasoline station thereat was dealer-owned
or company-owned. Undoubtedly, this exercise involves an
examination of facts which is normally beyond the ambit of this Court. For, well-settled
is the rule that this Court, not being a trier of
facts, does not normally embark in the evaluation of evidence adduced during
trial. The rule, however, admits of
exceptions. So
it is that in Sampayan v. Court of Appeals,[10] the Court held:
“[i]t is a settled rule that in the exercise of the Supreme
Court's power of review, the Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the re-examination
of the evidence presented by the contending parties' during the trial of the
case considering that the findings of facts of the CA are conclusive and
binding on the Court. However, the Court had recognized several
exceptions to this rule, to wit: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion;
(4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the
findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of
Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the
admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are
contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set
forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are
not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on
the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record;
and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts
not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion.”
To the Court, exceptions (5), (7)
and (11), above, find application in the instant case. And after a careful
evaluation of the evidence, the Court finds for the petitioner.
To begin with, the trial court’s
conclusion that Tan Pastor operated the gasoline station in his capacity as dealer-owner is well-supported by the
evidence on record. Pilipinas Shell has
shown clear and convincing proof that the outlet at Lot No. 853-A was dealer-owned gas station as per the
Certification of the president of the Shell Dealers Association of the
Besides, and as correctly observed by the trial court,
there was an admission by the respondent himself that, since 1982 up to 1991,
he had been in the possession of Lot No. 853-A and nobody else. Coming as it
does from the respondent no less, that statement commands great weight and
respect. The lower court succinctly summarizes:
“There
was no legal basis for plaintiff Carlos Gobonseng, Jr. to demand payment from
Pilipinas Shell as he himself admitted that he was in possession of the
property from 1982 to 1991. As his
testimony is against his interest, it became more believable the lack of legal
anchorage to base his demand for rental payment from 1982 to 1992. No less than the Court who asked him the
questions and hereunder is his answer:
“Court:
Q -- Who was in possession of the property
since 1982
up to 1991?
A -- I am the
actual possessor from 1982
to 1991.
Q -- Is it not a
fact that it was Julio
Tan
Pastor’s who was in possession
of that
property since 1982 and up to
1991?
A -- No, it is not,
Your Honor.
x x x x x x
Q -- You mean to
tell the Court that prior
to 1992
Julio Tan Pastor was not in
possession of the property in question?
A -- Not in
possession, Your Honor. As an
operator,
Your Honor, selling the shell
products,
Your Honor.
Q -- Who was in
possession of that property?
A -- Me, myself,
Your Honor.” (TSN, p. 5, 5-29-96)
What is more, respondent and Tan Pastor had already executed an
Agreement[11] whereunder
they declared that they had “no more further claims against each other, and
waived, abandoned, relinquished, any such claim or claims.” If anything else, such declaration evidenced respondent’s
stance in not collecting rentals for the use of the subject property as he even
in fact allowed Tan Pastor the “use of Lot No. 853-A at Corner Real-Urdaneta
Streets, Dumaguete City, covered by TCT No. 13607, as a gas/ fuel/ gasoline/
oil/ filling, selling and servicing, station, and for such other use
appropriate, or related, to the same, without
any rental for a period of THREE (3) YEARS from January 1st 1992, or
up to December 31st 1994, NON-EXTENDIBLE.” (Emphasis
supplied.)
Thus, respondent is now estopped from demanding payment of rentals from
Tan Pastor or Pilipinas Shell. In Bank of the Philippine
“Estoppel precludes individuals from
denying or asserting, by their own deed or representation, anything contrary to
that established as the truth, in legal contemplation. Our rules on evidence
even make a juris et de jure presumption
that whenever one has, by one’s own act or omission, intentionally and
deliberately led another to believe a particular thing to be true and to act
upon that belief, one cannot – in any litigation arising from such act or
omission – be permitted to falsify that supposed truth.”
Lastly, respondent insists that Pilipinas Shell had recognized his ownership
of Lot No. 853-A and his right to collect rentals when the latter, through a
letter,[13]
sought his permission to refurbish the gasoline station located thereat.
We are not persuaded.
A careful scrutiny of the letter referred to would reveal that it was
made and sent to respondent on
We note that in
the decision under review,
the CA made a finding that there
is not enough evidence for it to competently pass
upon and make
a ruling on
the nature of the gasoline station
situated on Lot No. 853-A. We rule and
so hold that such a finding all the more
strengthens the trial
court’s decision as more in accord with
the evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings thereat. As it is, the trial court’s decision reflects
and shows its distinct advantage of having heard the witnesses themselves,
observed their deportment and their manner of testifying and behavior during
trial.
Finally, respondent submits that the CA
correctly set aside the trial court’s decision on the ground that the judge who
heard most of the witnesses was other than the judge who ultimately penned the
decision in the case. On this score,
respondent argues that the findings of fact of the trial court cannot be given
credence and accorded due deference.
The Court does not
agree. The circumstance that the judge
who wrote the decision had not heard the testimonies of the witnesses does not
automatically taint his decision. Here, the decision of the trial court made
reference to several transcripts of stenographic notes taken in the course of
trial. Likewise, several exhibits were referred to and used as evidence to
substantiate the trial court’s conclusions. The validity of a decision is not
necessarily impaired by the fact that its ponente
only took over from a colleague who had
earlier presided at the trial.
This circumstance alone cannot be the basis for the reversal of the
trial court’s decision unless there is a clear showing of grave abuse of
discretion in the appreciation or a misapprehension of the facts,[14]
of which we find none.
WHEREFORE, the instant
petition is GRANTED and the assailed
Decision and Resolution of the CA are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The decision dated
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate Justice |
RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice |
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the
above decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of
the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Godardo A. Jacinto with Associate Justices Elvi John S. Asuncion and Lucas P. Bersamin, concurring; Rollo, pp. 37-45.
[2] Rollo, p. 69.
[3] Rollo, pp. 121-123.
[4] RTC Records, p. 63.
[5] CA Records, pp. 111-116.
[6] Supra note 1.
[7] Supra note 2.
[8] G.R. No. 126376,
[9] Ibid.
[10] G.R.
No. 156360, 14 January 2005, 448 SCRA 220 citing Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, 428 SCRA
79 (2004) citing Langkaan Realty
Development, Inc. v. United Coconut Planters Bank, 347 SCRA 542 (2000), Nokom v. National Labor Relations Commission,
390 Phil. 1228 (2000), Commissioner of
Internal Revenue v. Embroidery and Garments Industries (Phil.), Inc., 363
Phil. 541, (1999), Sta. Maria v. Court of
Appeals, 349 Phil. 275 (1998).
[11] Supra note 3.
[12] G.R. No. 149 and G.R. No. 149507,
[13] Letter dated
[14] People
v. Ulzoron, G.R. No. 121979,